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Thermal Surveillance and the Fourth
Amendment: Heating Up the War on
Drugs
I. Introduction
In 1971, Richard Nixon became the first President to officially
declare war on drugs.' Since that time the technologies used to
fight this war have rapidly advanced.2 In light of these advance-
ments, courts have faced the daunting challenge of further delineat-
ing the privacy rights established by the Fourth Amendment3 in
the context of a modern society.4 Most recently, federal and state
courts alike have had to determine Fourth Amendment implica-
tions arising out of the government's use of thermal surveillance techniques 5
1. James M. Naughton, President Gives Highest Priority to Drug Problem, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 1971, at Al.
2. See, e.g., John Larrabee, Surveillance Zooming in with High-Tech but Critics Fear
for Privacy, USA TODAY, Dec. 26, 1995, at A3.
3. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
4. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that the naked eye
observation of a greenhouse located behind a person's home from a helicopter flying at 400
feet is not a search); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that the naked eye
observation of a backyard of a home from an aircraft at an altitude of 1,000 feet does not
constitute a search); Dow Chemical Co. v United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (holding that
it is not a search to engage in high powered aerial photography of outdoor areas of Dow's
industrial complex); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (upholding warrantless
use of a chemical test to determine whether a packaged substance was cocaine); United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (upholding warrantless monitoring of a beeper in
defendant's automobile); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (holding that the use
of a drug detection dog to sniff luggage at an airport is not a search); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that establishing a "pen register" with phone company to trace what
phone numbers were called by a private residence is not a search); United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745 (1971) (upholding the warrantless use of a transmitting device planted on a
government informant).
5. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir.),
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Thermal surveillance devices detect differences in surface
temperatures of objects being observed.6  Although thermal
technology has been utilized by the military for decades, only
recently has this technology expanded into other areas.7 One such
area is law enforcement and drug interdiction, with the most
frequent targets being buildings suspected of housing indoor
marijuana growing operations.8 Because high-wattage, artificial
lights are used in marijuana growing operations, buildings housing
such operations generally emit an inordinate amount of heat.9
Government officials include evidence of excessive heat in
affidavits in support of a search warrant for premises suspected of
housing marijuana growing operations."0
This Comment focuses on whether the government's warrant-
less use of thermal surveillance techniques upon a residence
constitutes an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. Part II
of the Comment briefly describes thermal analysis and some of its
applications. Part III analyzes judicial treatment of other sense-
enhanced surveillance techniques. Part IV discusses relevant case
law and examines the principles and rationales used by courts that
have held that the use of thermal technology does not constitute a
search for which a warrant is required. Part V examines the
principles and rationales used by courts that have held that the use
of such surveillance constitutes a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Part VI concludes that the government's warrantless use of
thermal surveillance techniques on private residences violates the
Fourth Amendment.
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74, 75 (1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Robertson, 39 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992
(11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664
(1994); United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460 (E.D. Wash. 1994); United States
v. Deaner, No. 92-0090-01, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13046 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992), aff'd on
other grounds, 1 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220
(D. Haw. 1991), affd on other grounds, United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir.
1993); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994); State v. McKee, 510 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1993); State v. Cramer, 851 P.2d 147 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
6. See W. Conrad Holton, Shedding New Light on Crime, PHOTONICS SPECTRA, Dec.
1992, at 52.
7. See infra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
8. E.g., Eric Schlosser, Reefer Madness: Criminalization of Marijuana, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Aug. 1994, at 45; Aerial Thermal Surveillance of Residence Is Not "Search" Under
the Fourth Amendment, 55 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) No. 9, Jan. - June 1994, at 1193.





Thermal imagery provides a visual image of the heat radiating
from an object through the use of infrared detection equipment."
Thermal imaging devices detect, measure, and create images of
thermal energy as expressed by heat and infrared electromagnetic
radiation.12 A thermal imager can detect a temperature difference
in objects as little as a half a degree Celsius.13 The imager
displays these differences on a monitor in varying shades of white
and gray - a warm object appearing white and a cool object
appearing gray."
Thermal technology has been most frequently used by the
military to enhance its ability to enter into combat at night.1 5
Recently, the use of thermal imagery has expanded into other
areas.16 Thermal imagery devices are currently being used by
border patrols to detect illegal aliens, 7 by steel mills and pulp and
paper plants to measure production line temperatures from a safe
distance,18 in surgical procedures,19 in accidents and natural
disasters to locate bodies,' and to investigate the causes of
fires.21 The government's use of thermal surveillance techniques
on private residences, however, raises significant constitutional
concerns.
11. E.g., United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
12. See BERNARD WUNDERLICH, THERMAL ANALYSIS (1990); PAUL GARN, THERMO-
ANALYTICAL METHODS OF INVESTIGATION (1965).
13. E.g., United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1499 n.1 (10th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 1994).
14. E.g., United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 851-52 (5th Cir. 1995). The imager can
record this display on a standard videocassette. Id.
15. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Berardinis, No Place To Hide: Night-Vision Devices for
Military Use, MACHINE DESIGN, Oct. 24, 1991, at 57; Roger Lesser, Night Vision Technology
Continues To Improve, DEFENSE ELECTRONICS, Jan. 1993, at 45.
16. See Janice Fioravante, Night Sight, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Feb. 26, 1995, at A6.
17. E.g., Moira Farrow, Border Patrols Employ High-Tech Gear To Detect Aliens,
VANCOUVER SUN, May 21, 1994, at A4.
18. E.g., Richard Colby, Thermal Imagery Heats Up, OREGONIAN, Jan. 14, 1994, at 35.
19. E.g., Judy Siegel, IDF Night-Vision System Adapted for Surgery, JERUSALEM POST,
June 7, 1994, at 3.
20. E.g., Teilo Colley, Fifth Body Found in Head-on Train Crash Wreckage, PRESS
ASS'N NEWSFILE, Oct. 15, 1994.
21. E.g., Fire Crews Seek Smoke Cause at World Trade Center, REUTERS WORLD
SERVICE, Aug. 12, 1994.
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III. Sense-Enhanced Searches
Law enforcement officials have always utilized available
technologies in their effort to detect illegal activity.22 One of the
first sense-enhanced searches to be challenged was the govern-
ment's warrantless use of flashlights and similar means of artificial
illumination.23 In 1927, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States
v. Lee2" held that an illegal search did not result when the Coast
Guard shined a searchlight on a vessel and discovered cans of
illegal alcohol on board.' Overruling the court of appeals, the
Court emphasized the fact that the Coast Guard discovered the
contraband without physically trespassing on the boat.26 However,
United States v. Lee was decided well before Katz v. United
States,27 which held that Fourth Amendment search determina-
tions would no longer be decided on the basis of physical tres-
pass.2  Nonetheless, the Court has upheld the use of artificial
illumination by government agents when the agents make their
22. For scholarly pieces discussing Fourth Amendment issues raised by sense-enhanced
searches, see Clifford S. Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment:
Knotts, Karo, and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 277 (1985); Melvin
Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth Amendment in the
Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647 (1988); David E.
Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563 (1990); Kenneth
Troiano, Law Enforcement Use of High Technology: Does Closing the Door Matter
Anymore?, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 83 (1987); Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices and
the Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1977 U. ILL. L. REV. 1167; William F. Timmons,
Comment, Re-examining the Use of Drug-Detecting Dogs Without Probable Cause, 71 GEO.
L.J. 1233 (1983); Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts: Beeper Monitoring and Collective Fourth
Amendment Rights, 71 VA. L. REV. 297 (1985).
23. The Fourth Amendment warrant requirement was designed to protect citizens
against the dangers of general warrants. See Steinburg, supra note 22, at 574-75. "The
general warrant was a British document authorizing law enforcement officials to conduct an
unlimited search of a suspect's property." Id. at 574.
24. 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 563.
The testimony of the boatswain shows that he used a searchlight. It is not shown
that there was any exploration below the decks or under the hatches. For aught
that appears, the cases of liquor were on deck and, like the defendants, were
discovered before the motorboat was boarded. Such use of a searchlight is
comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited by the
Constitution.
Id.
27. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 53-59.
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observation from a lawful viewpoint.29 This type of search is
generally upheld on a "plain view" rationale.30
A majority of courts have upheld the warrantless use of
binoculars and telescopes to view homes and offices, often relying
on the grounds that there had been no physical trespass and the
activity observed was in "plain view."3  In On Lee v. United
States,32 the Supreme Court stated in dicta that "[t]he use of
bifocals, field glasses or the telescope to magnify the object of a
witness' vision is not a forbidden search or seizure, even if they
focus without [the defendant's] knowledge or consent upon what
one supposes to be private indiscretions. '33  Courts have not
uniformly approved of the government's warrantless use of tele-
scopes and binoculars to scrutinize private homes?4
Some courts have held that such use of surveillance equipment
invades a constitutionally protected area and, therefore, invokes the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.35 In United States v.
Kim, 36 the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) used a high-
powered telescope to observe illegal gambling activities in the
defendant's apartment from a location a quarter of a mile away.
37
The district court held that this warrantless surveillance was
unconstitutional, stating:
It is inconceivable that the government can intrude so far into
an individual's home that it can detect the material he is
reading and still not be considered to have engaged in a search.
If government agents have probable cause to suspect criminal
29. E.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (upholding search in which a policeman
lawfully stopped a vehicle, shined his flashlight into the car, and observed illegal narcotics).
30. Through a series of cases, the Supreme Court has established a "plain view"
exception to the warrant requirement. See Steinburg, supra note 22, at 596-97. Under this
exception, an officer may warrantlessly seize evidence that is in the officer's plain view when
the officer is lawfully located in a place from which the evidence can be plainly seen. Id.
31. E.g., United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1055 (1987); Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830
(1968); United States v. Christensen, 524 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Commonwealth v.
Hernley, 263 A.2d 904 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971).
32.. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
33. Id. at 754.
34. See generally Lawrence Kaiser Marks, Note, Telescopes, Binoculars, and the Fourth
Amendment, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 379 (1982).
35. E.g., United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Kim,
415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976); State v. Knight, 621 P.2d 370 (Haw. 1980); State v.
Blacker, 630 P.2d 413 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
36. 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976).
37. Id. at 1254.
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activity and feel the need for telescopic surveillance, they may
apply for a warrant; otherwise they have no right to peer into
people's windows with special equipment not generally in
use.
38
Similarly in United States v. Taborda,39 Drug Enforcement Agents
observed a cocaine manufacturing process taking place in an
apartment from a location across the street, partially with their
unaided eyes and partially with a high-powered telescope.' The
court held that, although the plain view, unenhanced observation
was permissible, the use of a high-powered telescope without a
warrant constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment.41
Although the majority of courts have upheld the warrantless use of
telescopes and binoculars in the surveillance of homes and offices,
Kim and Taborda reflect the conflicting views regarding sense-
enhanced searches.
The evolution of the law regarding the use of wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping is much clearer. In Olmstead v. United
States,42 government agents became aware of a conspiracy to
violate the National Prohibition Act43 by intercepting telephone
conversations.' Placing great emphasis on the fact that the
government tapped into the telephone wires without any physical
intrusion upon the property of the defendants,45 the Supreme
Court held that messages passing over telephone wires were not
"effects" protected by the Fourth Amendment.' Olmstead was
followed by Goldman v. United States,47 in which the Supreme
Court held that the use of an electronic listening device did not
constitute a search if the surveillance was not accompanied by a
physical intrusion or trespass.
48
38. Id. at 1256 (citation omitted).
39. 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980).
40. Id. at 134.
41. Id. at 138-39.
42. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
43. Pub. L. No. 66-66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919), repealed by Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 740,
Pub. L. No. 74-347, 49 Stat. 872.
44. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456-57.
45. "The [Fourth] [A]mendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no
searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of
hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants." Id.
at 464.
46. Id. at 466.
47. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
48. Id. at 134-35.
[Vol. 100:2
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In Silverman v. United States,49 .the Supreme Court abrogated
the "trespass" doctrine it established through Olmstead and Gold-
man. In Silverman, government officers surreptitiously implanted
a "spike mike"5 in the wall of the defendant's home, enabling
them to hear conversations taking place on both floors of the
home.51 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that
the government's conduct amounted to an illegal search and
seizure.1
2
In 1967 the "trespass" doctrine was officially turned on its
head by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States.53 In what
has become the modern fountainhead of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court concluded "that the underpinnings of
Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by [this Court's]
subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated
can no longer be regarded as controlling." 4
In Katz, the FBI attached an electronic listening device to the
outside of a public telephone booth and recorded telephone
conversations of the defendant.55 The fact that the electronic
listening device did not penetrate the wall of the telephone booth
was accorded "no constitutional significance.5 16 Justice Harlan, in
his concurring opinion, formulated the two-prong test still applied
by the Court today in determining whether a search requires a war-
rant.57 The government must obtain a search warrant if both
prongs of the test are satisfied: First, the individual must exhibit a
subjective expectation of privacy. Second, that expectation must be
one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.58 The
Court held that the FBI's actions constituted a search for which a
warrant was required.
The Supreme Court has differentiated between the use of
sensory enhancement devices upon homes from their use on other
49. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
50. The Court described a "spike-mike" as "a microphone with a spike about a foot long
attached to it, together with an amplifier, a power pack, and earphones." Id. at 506.
51. Id. at 506-07.
52. Id. at 505.
53. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
54. Id. at 353.
55. Id. at 348.
56. Id. at 353.
57. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).




objects. In United States v. Knotts, ° the defendant purchased a
five-gallon drum in which a beeper61 was concealed by Minnesota
law enforcement agents.62 After the defendant placed the drum
in his car, government officers were then able to track the
movement of the defendant's car to a cabin in the woods.63 The
beeper was not monitored once the drum had been moved inside
the cabin.' The Supreme Court held that the use of the beeper
did not constitute a search, noting that the vehicle could have been
tracked by enhanced, visual surveillance.65
Similarly, in United States v. Karo,66 a beeper was placed
inside a can of ether.67 Government agents then tracked the can
as it moved from the defendant's home to another defendant's
home, to a commercial storage facility, to the residence of a third
defendant, and finally to a residence rented by all three codefen-
dants.' The Court held that the use of the beeper to monitor the
location of the can while it was inside the defendants' vehicles
traveling on public roads did not violate the Fouth Amendment.
69
The Court ruled, however, that the monitoring of the beeper while
it was in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveil-
lance, constituted a search requiring a warrant.70  Thus, the
determination of whether a sense-enhanced search constitutes an
unreasonable search for which a warrant is required may hinge
upon the target of the search.71
The Supreme Court has upheld the warrantless use of trained
dogs to detect the presence of narcotics and explosives in a public
airport. In United States v. Place,72 drug enforcement agents,
60. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
61. "A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic
signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver." Id. at 277.
62. Id. at 278.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
66. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
67. I& at 708.
68. Id. at 708-10. The tracking of the can from location to location took place over a
six-month period in which government officials used both visual and beeper surveillance to
monitor the position of the can. Id.
69. Id. at 720-21.
70. Id. at 715.
71. For example, warrantless searches and seizures of private residences are
presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances. See infra note 183 and
accompanying text.
72. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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without a warrant, seized the defendant's luggage after his arrival
at La Guardia Airport.73 The agents then took the luggage to
Kennedy Airport, where it was subjected to a sniff test by a trained
narcotics dog.74 The dog reacted positively to one of the suitcas-
es.75 Ninety minutes had elapsed from the time the luggage was
seized until the sniff test actually took place.76 The Court held
that the government's actions in Place violated the Fourth Amend-
ment, but further stated that, had the government detained the
luggage briefly, the use of the dog sniff would not have required a
warrant.77 In its reasoning, the Court emphasized the unique
nature of this sense-enhanced search:
A "canine sniff' by a well-trained narcotics detection dog,
however, does not require opening the luggage. It does not
expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain
hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer's
rummaging through the contents of the luggage. Thus, the
manner in which information is obtained through this investiga-
tive technique is much less intrusive than a typical search.
Moreover, the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of
narcotics, a contraband item.78
Based on the fact that the search is minimally intrusive and
discloses only criminal behavior, a dog sniff is not an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court used this same rationale-in holding that a chemical
test that discloses whether a substance is a narcotic does not
compromise any legitimate privacy expectation.79 Because such
a chemical test reveals only whether a substance is contraband, the
Court stated that its holding in Place dictates the conclusion that




77. Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10.
78. Id. at 707. It should be noted that dog sniffs are not always 100% reliable. In one
instance, a dog alerted officers to a thirteen-year-old girl during a school-wide search. The
girl was subjected to a conventional search as well as a strip search, but it was later
discovered that the dog was set off because the girl had recently been petting her dog who
was in heat. Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), affd in part, remanded
in part, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980).
79. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
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the test is not a search for which the Fourth Amendment requires
a warrant.80
This body of law, although not an exhaustive examination of
sense-enhanced searches, forms the basis for what courts have
relied upon to determine whether the warrantless use of thermal
surveillance upon a residence violates the Fourth Amendment.81
IV. Judicial Confirmation of the Warrantless Use of Thermal
Surveillance
In United States v. Penny-Feeney, the United States District
Court for the District of Hawaii became the first court to consider
whether the Fourth Amendment precludes the use of thermal
surveillance of a residence absent a warrant.83 In holding that the
use of heat-detecting technology does not amount to an illegal
search,84 the Penny-Feeney court set forth an analysis that has
been followed by a number of other courts considering the same
issue. The Penny-Feeney court applied the test for determining
the existence of a Fourth Amendment interest established by the
United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 86 and
concluded that the codefendants had neither an actual subjective
expectation of privacy nor an expectation of privacy that society
would recognize as reasonable.'
80. Id. at 123. The Court stated:
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is
cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy. This conclusion
is not dependent on the result of any particular test. It is probably safe to assume
that virtually all of the tests conducted under circumstances comparable to those
disclosed by this record would result in a positive finding; in such cases, no
legitimate interest has been compromised. But even if the results are negative -
merely disclosing that the substance is something other than cocaine - such a
result reveals nothing of special interest.
Id.
81. For more detailed analysis of sense-enhanced search issues, see supra note 22.
82. 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991), affd on other grounds, United States v. Feeney,
984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
83. The court also addressed two additional issues: (1) whether there was probable cause
to support a search warrant based on facts provided by three informants and independent
of the use of the thermal surveillance, and (2) whether probable cause existed for the
issuance. Id.
84. Id. at 228.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 117-29.
86. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see supra text accompanying notes 53-59.
87. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226.
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In determining that the defendants had no subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, the most significant aspect of the Penny-Feeney
court's analysis was its examination of the heat itself. The court
characterized the heat emanating from the defendants' home as
"heat waste" and "abandoned heat," due to the fact that the
defendants used fans to vent the heat outside of the home.
Because the defendants voluntarily vented the heat outside "where
it could be exposed to the public," 9 the court concluded that the
defendants could have no actual subjective expectation of priva-
cy.9
0
The Penny-Feeney court also used its characterization of the
heat as "heat waste" to conclude that even if the defendants had a
subjective expectation of privacy, it would not be recognized as
reasonable by society.91 This characterization strengthened the
court's analogy to California v. Greenwood,92 which held that the
search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the
curtilage of a home does not require a search warrant.93  In
Greenwood, the Supreme Court determined that an expectation of
privacy in garbage bags left outside the home is not one that
society would accept as reasonable. 94 The Penny-Feeney court
equated the "heat waste" vented outside of the defendants' home
with the garbage bags placed outside the home in Greenwood.95
Consequently, it held that even if the defendants had a subjective
expectation of privacy, it was not one that society would recognize
as reasonable.96
The Penny-Feeney court cited to several cases holding that the
use of sense-enhancing, non-intrusive equipment does not constitute
an illegal search.97 Particular emphasis was placed upon United
88. Id. at 225.
89. Id. at 226.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 40.
95. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226. "Both cases [Penny-Feeney and Greenwood]
involve a homeowner's disposing of waste matter in areas exposed to the public." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (upholding warrantless
monitoring of a beeper in defendant's automobile)); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696
(1983) (holding that the use of a drug detection dog to sniff luggage at an airport is not a
search); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that establishing a "pen register"
with phone company to trace what phone numbers were called by a private residence is not
1996]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
States v. Solis.9" In Solis, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that the use of a drug detection dog to
detect the odor of marijuana inside a semi-trailer parked in a public
area was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amend-
ment.99 The court in Solis reasoned that the defendant had no
expectation of privacy because "[t]here was an expectation that the
odor would emanate from the trailer."''" The Penny-Feeney court
asserted that, like Solis, "there was an expectation that the heat in
this case would emanate from the [defendants'] garage since it was
deliberately vented by the use of exhaust fans and other electrical
means."10 1 Therefore, the defendants had no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy. 2
In a number of cases, victims of thermal surveillance have
attempted to distinguish Penny-Feeney by arguing that they did not
voluntarily vent heat from their home as was done in Penny-
Feeney.1°3 This argument, however, has not proven success-
ful."° The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania stated:
The court agrees that there is no evidence that the defendants
in this case abandoned their interest in the heat. However, the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government from
using the [thermal surveillance device] to determine tempera-
ture differences on the surfaces of structures, regardless of
whether the structure vents its heat or not. The fact that the
[thermal surveillance device] is a sophisticated electronic device
is irrelevant. Just as an individual has no expectation of privacy
as to the odors emitted from their home or luggage, there is no
expectation of privacy as to heat emanating from one's
home.'05
a search).
98. 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 882.
101. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 227.
102. Id.
103. E.g., United States v. Porco, 842 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (D. Wyo. 1994), affd on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Deaner, No. 92-0090-01, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13046, at *8 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992), affd
on other grounds, 1 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1993).
104. E.g., Porco, 842 F. Supp. at 1397; Deaner, No. 92-0090-01, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS,
at *8.
105. Deaner, No. 92-0090-01, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *8-9 (citing United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
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The court held that, although the fact that the defendant did not
vent the heat outside may evidence a subjective expectation of
privacy, it is still not an expectation that society would deem
reasonable t 6
Another rationale employed by the Penny-Feeney court and
reiterated by its progeny is that thermal surveillance is non-
intrusive in nature." 7 These courts have reasoned that, because
thermal surveillance is passive"° and reveals no intimate details
of the home, this technology does not threaten the intimacy,
personal autonomy or privacy protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. t°9 This argument is significant because the Supreme Court
has considered the intimacy of detail and activity revealed by
surveillance techniques in previous Fourth Amendment cases.11 °
In Oliver v. United States,"' the Court reaffirmed the "open
fields" doctrine, 12 holding that individuals have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in open fields, because "open fields do not
106. Id.
107. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 227-28.
[The government agent] did no more than aim a passive infrared instrument at
defendants' house from an aerial vantage point for the purpose of detecting
disposed heat on the exterior of the house. No intimate details connected with the
use of the home or curtilage were observed, and there was no undue noise, no
wind, dust, or threat of injury.
Id. at 228.
108. Porco, 842 F. Supp. at 1396. The Porco court explained how thermal surveillance
is passive:
The thermal imaging device does not detect or enhance visible light, but rather,
operates in the thermal infrared spectrum to detect differences in temperature of
the surface of objects being viewed. It is a passive, non-intrusive system which
does not penetrate or send any rays or beams into the area which is being viewed.
The device is a hand held unit which looks like a 35 mm camera. Its range ... is
from between 2 feet to one quarter of a mile.
Id.
109. E.g., United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
664 (1994).
110. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
111. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
112. See Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (establishing the "open fields"
doctrine). In determining whether an area falls within the curtilage of the home or in an
"open field" area, the Court considers four factors:
[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area
is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to
which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
observation by the people passing by.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
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provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amend-
ment is intended to shelter from government interference or
surveillance."" 3 Similarly, in Florida v. Riley,"4 the Court held
that no search occurred when a police officer flew a helicopter at
a height of 400 feet over a partially enclosed greenhouse and
observed marijuana." 5 In so holding, the Court noted that no
intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage
were observed. 6 It is evident, therefore, that the Supreme Court
considers the intimacy of detail observed through surveillance
techniques in making Fourth Amendment determinations.
Several federal courts of appeals have followed the rationale
of the district court in Penny-Feeney and held that thermal
surveillance does not constitute an illegal search. In United States
v. Pinson,' the Eighth Circuit became the first federal court of
appeals to hold that the warrantless use of thermal surveillance is
not an illegal search." 8 The court dismissed the appeal in a four-
page decision by adopting the rationale of the Penny-Feeney
decision, including the "heat waste" characterization and the
analogy to dog sniff cases. 9  In United States v. Ford,"2 the
Eleventh Circuit decided that the defendant had neither a subjec-
tive nor objective expectation of privacy in the heat detected in his
mobile home. The court concluded that the defendant could have
no subjective expectation of privacy because he took affirmative
actions to vent excess heat from his mobile home.' The court
determined that there was no objective expectation of privacy
based, in large part, on its finding that the thermal technology
involved could not reveal sensitive or personal activities within the
mobile home." The Seventh Circuit held similarly in a three-
113. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179.
114. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
115. Id. at 450.
116. Id. at 452.
117. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
118. Id. at 1059.
119. Id. at 1058; see supra pp. 424-27.
120. 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
121. Id. at 995. The defendant forced out the warm air in the mobile home using an
electric blower. Id.
122. Id. at 996-97. The court stated:
Although the device used by the [state police] can detect differences as small as
half a degree, as used against [the defendant] it could only describe conditions
within the mobile home in gross detail. The [state police] operator was able to
detect high heat transmission from underneath the mobile home and in one comer
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page decision that relied, almost exclusively, on the Pinson and
Ford decisions."
The Fifth Circuit has also held that the warrantless use of
thermal surveillance does not violate the Fourth Amendment. In
United States v. Ishmael,24 the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's holding requiring a search warrant before the government
may utilize thermal surveillance techniques" The circuit court
held that, although the defendants exhibited a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy,"26 their expectation was not one that society
would accept as reasonable. 27 In Ishmael, however, the structure
that was subjected to thermal surveillance was not a private resi-
dence. 2s  Because this structure was beyond the defendants'
residential curtilage, the court relied upon the open fields doctrine
to uphold the warrantless search. 29 The open fields doctrine
would have been inapplicable had a private residence been the
target of the government's search.
V. Judicial Scrutiny of the Warrantless Use of Thermal Surveil-
lance
A number of courts have held that the warrantless use of a
thermal surveillance device violates the Fourth Amendment.1 30
The first court to do so was the Supreme Court of Washington in
State v. Young. 131  In Young, the Drug Enforcement Agency
assisted local police in the thermal surveillance of the defendant's
home, which indicated that the home was emanating more heat
than other residences in the area. 32 This information was includ-
wall of the structure, extending up four or five feet from the floor. Such
information is neither sensitive nor personal, nor does it reveal the specific
activities within the mobile home.
Id.
123. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995).
124. 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74, 75 (1995).
125. See United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 48 F.3d 850
(5th Cir.), and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74, 75 (1995).
126. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 854-55.
127. Id. at 855-57.
128. The court described the structure as "a large steel building." Id. at 851.
129. Id. at 856.
130. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ishmael,
843 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir.), and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
74, 75 (1995); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
131. 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
132. Id. at 595.
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ed in an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant for Young's
home.133  The Supreme Court of Washington held that the
warrantless use of thermal surveillance violated the Fourth
Amendment,'34 as well as article 1, section 7 of the Washington
State Constitution.
1 35
In conducting its Fourth Amendment analysis, the Young court
observed that courts generally afford greater protection from
searches and seizures occurring in the home than searches and
seizures occurring in a public place.1 36 To illustrate this point, the
court compared two Supreme Court cases that differentiated the
use of sensory enhancement devices in homes from their use on
other objects.137  Citing United States v. Karo, the Young court
concluded that "[w]hen the police use sense-enhancing devices to
obtain information from someone's home that could not be
obtained by unaided observation of the exterior, they should have
a search warrant.
138
The Young court was not persuaded by the "heat waste"
analogy to California v. Greenwood made by the Penny-Feeney
court, stating that one does not dispose of heat in the same manner
one disposes of garbage.1 39  While one voluntarily leaves his
garbage on the curb, heat dissipates from a home without any
effort on the part of the homeowner:140
133. Id.
134. Id. at 604.
135. Id. at 599. Article 1, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution provides: "No
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
As the federal judiciary has grown more conservative over the past few decades, state
supreme courts have increasingly relied upon state constitutions to provide greater civil
liberties for their citizens than are required by the Federal Constitution. See ROBERT F.
WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-4 (1993); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977)
(advocating the use of state constitutions to expand individual rights).
136. Young, 867 P.2d at 601.
137. Id. (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984): United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276 (1983)).
138. Id. at 604 (citing Karo, 468 U.S. at 714).
139. Id. at 602-03. Moreover, the Young court recognized that the Supreme Court of
Washington had previously declined to follow the rationale of Greenwood. Id. at 602-03 n.3;
see State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990). The court has held instead that a person's
garbage falls under the private affairs protection provided by article 1, section 7 of the
Washington State Constitution. Id. at 1115-16.
140. Young, 867 P.2d at 602.
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Even if some heat is vented to the outside, as in Penny-Feeney,
the [thermal surveillance] device detects all heat leaving the
home, not just heat directed out through the vent .... [T]he
only way for a person to avoid the risk of exposure in this case
... would be to turn off all heat sources in the home, even in
sub-zero temperatures."'
The court determined, therefore, that the heat emanating from
one's home is not "heat waste" or "abandoned heat," in which the
homeowner has no legitimate expectation of privacy.142
The Tenth Circuit is the only circuit to hold that the warrant-
less use of thermal surveillance on a private residence violates the
Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Cusumano,'43 the circuit
court disagreed with the rationale used by the district court, which
held that the use of thermal surveillance upon a private residence
was not a search for which a warrant is required."4
While recognizing the persuasiveness of decisions from other
circuits, the Cusumano court stated the pertinent issue somewhat
differently than previous courts.'45 The inquiry for the court was
not "whether the Defendants retain an expectation of privacy in
the 'waste heat' radiated from their home but, rather, whether they
possess an expectation of privacy in the heat signatures of the
activities, intimate or otherwise, that they pursue within their
home.''146 In phrasing the issue in this manner, the court recog-
nized the reality of thermal surveillance:
While the heat lost by a building is data of some limited value,
the true worth of the [thermal surveillance] device ... is
predicated upon the translation of these thermal records into
intelligible (albeit speculative) information about the activities
that generate the observed heat. The utility of the machine
depends therefore not on the inevitable and ubiquitous
phenomenon of heat loss but on the presence of distinguishable
heat signatures inside the structure. We see no reason to blind
ourselves to the physical reality of this relationship by severing
our analysis of the heat differentials emanating through the
141. Id. at 603.
142. Id. at 602.
143. 67 F.3d 1497 (10th Cir. 1995).
144. Id. The Tenth Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's decision on other
grounds. Id. at 1510.
145. Id. at 1500-02.
146. Id. at 1502.
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walls of a structure from an informed consideration of the heat
sources within that structure.
147
The Cusumano court concluded that the defendants did indeed
possess an expectation of privacy in the heat signatures in their
home."4 The court first determined that, because the defendants
took affirmative steps to protect themselves from observation, they
clearly established a subjective expectation of privacy.1 49  The
court then concluded that the use of thermal surveillance on a
private residence intrudes upon an objectively reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy."s The court made this conclusion after finding
that thermal technology reveals information that cannot be
discerned by the public at large.15'
VI. A Fourth Amendment Analysis of Thermal Surveillance
Traditionally the home has enjoyed the most rigorous
protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 52 While the
government may employ technologically advanced tools on certain
targets without a warrant, 153 the government's use of thermal
surveillance techniques on private residences is a search for which
a warrant is required.
Proper application of the Katz test dictates that a warrant be
obtained before conducting thermal surveillance. To satisfy the
first prong of the Katz two-prong test, a criminal defendant must
establish a subjective expectation of privacy. " In cases involving
the use of thermal surveillance, the government routinely contends
that defendants cannot have subjective expectations of privacy
147. Id. at 1501.
148. Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1502.
149. Id. at 1502-03. The court explained that it is unnecessary to take all possible
precautions to prevent detection in order to establish a subjective expectation of privacy.
Id. (citing Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-50 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
211-12 (1986)).
150. Id. at 1506.
151. Id. at 1504.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 590 (1980); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core
[of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
153. E.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (upholding legality
of government agency's warrantless use of aerial photography to gain information about
industrial plant).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
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because they do not conceal the heat emanating from their
homes.155  As the Fifth Circuit recognized in Ishmael, this is too
restrictive of an interpretation of the Katz first prong.156  The
Court in Katz found that the defendant had a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in a public phone booth, even though he did not
take every precaution against electronic eavesdropping.157 Simi-
larly, in California v. Ciraolo,158 police officers flew over the
defendant's home in a helicopter and observed marijuana growing
in the backyard. 59 Although the Court concluded that this
warrantless search was constitutional, it did find that the defendant
demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy by concealing the
property from ground view by two fences."6° Therefore, a defen-
dant need not take every available precaution against government
intrusion in order to manifest a subjective expectation of priva-
cy.
16 1
The second prong of the Katz test requires the finding of an
objective expectation of privacy. 62 Those courts holding that the
use of thermal technology upon a private residence does not
intrude upon an objective expectation of privacy have cited to
California v. Greenwood16" for support. These analogies, howev-
er, are inapt. The Court in Greenwood concluded that there is no
objective expectation of privacy in curbside garbage because it is
placed "in an area particularly suited for public inspection," and
"[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at
the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops and other members of the public."'"
155. E.g., United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ford,
34 F.3d 992, 995 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1472-73
(E.D. Wash. 1994).
156. Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 854-55 (stating that a defendant need not take every precaution
against detection in order to establish a subjective expectation of privacy).
157. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
158. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
159. Id. at 209.
160. Id. at 211-12.
161. As the Tenth Circuit stated: "To hold otherwise would leave the privacy of the
home at the mercy of the government's ability to exploit technological -advances: the
government could always argue that an individual's failure (or inability) to ward off the
incursions of the latest scientific innovation forfeits the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment." United v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1503 (10th Cir. 1995).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
163. 486 U.S. 35 (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 91-96.
164. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41.
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It is not common knowledge, however, that the heat emanating
from one's residence may be measured by a thermal surveillance
device.165 While in Greenwood there was reason to believe that
an individual's garbage might be rummaged through, here there is
no reason to suspect that members of the public will spend large
sums of moneyt66 in order to scrutinize the amount of heat
radiating from their neighbors' homes.
Not only does application of Katz dictate that use of thermal
surveillance requires a warrant, the Supreme Court has indicated
that there is a limit to what types of technology may be used to
gather information without a search warrant. In Dow Chemical Co.
v. United States, 67 the Supreme Court held that the warrantless
use of an aerial mapping camera by the government while flying
over Dow Chemical's facility did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment, but the Court intimated that the use of highly sophisticated
technology not generally available to the public would require a
warrant.' 6 The Court noted "that surveillance of private proper-
ty by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not
generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might
be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant., 169  Arguably,
thermal surveillance is the type of sophisticated technology to
which the Court referred.17
Further support that thermal surveillance is a Fourth Amend-
ment search is the distinction between thermal surveillance and the
dog sniff cases. Courts approving of the government's warrantless
use of thermal surveillance have cited United States v. Place7' for
support.7 The analogy between thermal surveillance and dog
sniffs fails because the nature of the searches themselves are
different. In Place, the Supreme Court held that the use of a drug
detection dog to sniff luggage at an airport did not constitute a
165. It is not likely that this technology is utilized by the public at large; the cost of a
thermal imaging system runs anywhere from $100,000 to $1.6 million. Brian Finnerty, Putting
Night Vision Technology in Daylight Use, INVESTOR's Bus DAILY, Apr. 19, 1994, at A6.
166. Id.
167. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
168. Id. at 238.
169. Id.
170. United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 212 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 48 F.3d 850
(5th Cir.), and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74, 75 (1995).
171. 462 U.S. 696 (1983); see supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
172. E.g., United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991), affd on
other grounds, United States v. Feeniey, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
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search under the Fourth Amendment.173 In so ruling, the Court
relied heavily on the fact that the dog sniff search can reveal only
the presence or non-presence of contraband. 7 4 The same cannot
be said of thermal surveillance. When a thermal imager senses an
excessive amount of heat emanating from a home, this may or may
not indicate the presence of an indoor marijuana growing opera-
tion. It may simply be the result of a tanning bed, hot tub, jacuzzi,
pottery kiln, or -even a clothes dryer. 75 For example, U.S.
Customs agents, police, and National Guard soldiers recently
stormed a 32-acre ranch in New Mexico after using a thermal
surveillance device, only to find scores of sunflower plants.1
7 6
The dog sniff analogy also fails due to the distinction between
public and private searches. The dog sniff approved by the
Supreme Court in Place was a public search,'77 while thermal
surveillance devices generally target private residences. The Penny-
Feeney court and others rely upon United States v. Solis,178 in
which the Ninth Circuit held that the use of drug detection dogs to
detect the odor of marijuana emanating from a semi-trailer parked
in a public area was not an unreasonable search requiring a
warrant. 179  A better analogy, however, is provided by United
States v. Thomas.t ° In Thomas, the Second Circuit discussed the
difference between a dog sniff occurring in a public place and one
occurring at a private residence:
[A] practice that is not intrusive in a public airport may be
intrusive when employed at a person's home.... With a trained
dog police may obtain information about what is inside a
dwelling that they could not derive from the use of their own
senses.... Here the defendant had a legitimate expectation that
173. Place, 462 U.S. at 707; see supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
174. Place, 462 U.S. at 707; see supra text accompanying note 78.
175. These examples are certainly not implausible; thermal imaging
devices candetect a human form through an open window when the
person is leaning against the curtain, and pressing the curtain
between the window screen and his or her body. The device can
also detect the warmth generated by a person leaning against a
relatively thin barrier such as a plywood door.
State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994).
176. Andrew Schneider, Sunflower Raid: Hard Feelings, No Apologies, PLAIN DEALER,
Sept. 14, 1995, at A2.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
178. 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976); see supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
179. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
180. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985), 479 U.S. 818 (1986).
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the contents of his closed apartment would remain private, that
they could not be "sensed" from outside his door .... Because
of [the defendant's] heightened expectation of privacy inside his
dwelling, the canine sniff at his door constituted a search.181
The Thomas decision recognizes that the location of a search is
significant."8  The Supreme Court has considered warrantless
searches and seizures of a residence to be presumptively unreason-
able absent exigent circumstances.l" The Supreme Court has not
upheld the use of a drug detection dog on a private residence.
Thus, the analogy of thermal technology on one's home to a dog
sniff is unpersuasive. 84
Courts faced with the thermal surveillance issue have focused
on the fact that the thermal surveillance equipment is "passive" and
cannot actually "look" into a residence." 5 While technically
true,i" 6 this description ignores the deeper significance of this
technology. The four walls and roof of a home do not produce any
heat. The heat is generated from inside the house. In this sense,
thermal technology can determine the amount of heat produced
inside a home, which information can then be used to determine
181. Id. at 1366-67.
182. Id.; see also Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("The Fourth
Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core
stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.").
183. E.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); see supra text
accompanying notes 60-71; see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
184. Perhaps Justice Frank stated the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home most
eloquently:
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can retreat
thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot get at him
without disobeying the Constitution. That is still a sizeable hunk of liberty -
worth protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized society must
provide some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated
enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is man's castle.
United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting), affid, 343
U.S. 747 (1952).
185. See, e.g., United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
74, 75 (1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996-97 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 224 (D. Haw. 1991), affd on other grounds, United States
v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); cf United States v. Field, 855 F. Supp. 1518, 1530
(W.D. Wis. 1994) (calling this description of thermal surveillance a "red herring").
186. Thermal surveillance can, however, identify the movement of a human body through
foliage and underbrush. United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1504 (10th Cir. 1995).
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what a citizen is doing inside the home."s  If this technology
could not reveal what is happening inside the home, the govern-
ment would not be using it as a surveillance tool.
The seminal case of Katz itself dictates that the warrantless use
of thermal surveillance be found violative of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Penny-Feeney and its progeny contend that thermal
surveillance devices act passively and are non-intrusive and,
therefore, their use does not constitute a search.ss The electronic
listening device utilized by the government in Katz was also passive
and non-intrusive.89 The Court, however, abandoned the "tres-
pass" doctrine and determined that when Mr. Katz entered the
public telephone booth and shut the door behind him, he had an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy which the government
could not intrude upon absent a warrant."tg It is anomalous to
hold that there is an objective expectation of privacy behind the
door of a public telephone booth, but not behind the door of one's
own home.'91 If that is the case, there is no place where one can
truly be "left alone.""9
187. As early as 1885, in the first significant Fourth Amendment decision, the Supreme
Court recognized that the Amendment was intended to protect more than actual, physical
searches of the home:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional
liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then
before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions on
the part of the government and its employ6s of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property ....
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
189. See supra text accompanying note 56.
190. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
191. Professor Amsterdam foresaw the dangerous effect of high-tech surveillance twenty
years ago:
[S]o far as I am presently advised on the state of the mechanical arts - anyone
can protect himself against surveillance by retiring to the cellar, cloaking all the
windows with thick caulking, turning off the lights and remaining absolutely quiet.
This much withdrawal is not required in order to claim the benefit of the
amendment because, if it were, the amendment's benefit would be too stingy to
preserve the kind of open society which we are committed and in which the
amendment is supposed to function.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 402
(1974).
192. The Framers of our Constitution "sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be left alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
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In considering whether thermal surveillance constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant, it is important to
consider the burden this would place on law enforcment officers.
Requiring a search warrant for the use of thermal technology on a
residence will have a negligible effect on law enforcement.
Although the information gained from the use of thermal surveil-
lance is generally included in an affidavit in support of a search
warrant,1 93 the government is capable of gathering sufficient
evidence to obtain a search warrant without resorting to thermal
surveillance. This is evidenced by the fact that numerous courts
faced with the Fourth Amendment implications of thermal
surveillance have avoided the issue because sufficient independent
evidence supported a finding of probable cause. 94 Penny-Feeney
itself was affirmed on other grounds by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which declined to address the issue of thermal surveillance
because it found sufficient independent evidence to support the
finding of probable cause.' 95  The government generally has
evidence such as anonymous tips, confidential informants, electrici-
ty records, and testimony regarding the defendant's purchase of
large amounts of greenhouse supplies to include in its affidavit, thus
making the use of thermal surveillance superfluous.1 96
VII. Conclusion
The government's warrantless use of thermal surveillance upon
a private residence violates the Fourth Amendment. Although the
warrantless use of certain sense-enhancing devices have been
upheld in the past, the Supreme Court has traditionally afforded
greater protection against searches of private residences. The
Supreme Court has also intimated that the government's use of
sophisticated technology, not generally available to the public,
civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 209 (E.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 48
F.3d 850 (5th Cir.), and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74, 75 (1995).
194. E.g., United States v. Olson, 21 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Deaner,
1 F.3d 192 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Casanova, 835 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. N.Y. 1993);
State v. Binner, 877 P.2d 642 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (all finding sufficient evidence to support
probable cause independent of the evidence obtained through the use of thermal
surveillance).
195. United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1993), affg on other grounds
United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1467, 1509-10 (10th Cir. 1995).
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would implicate the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
Courts upholding the government's warrantless use of thermal
surveillance have emphasized the passive nature of this technology.
Whether the technology is non-intrusive, however, is not disposi-
tive, as the Supreme Court abandoned the "trespass" doctrine over
twenty-five years ago. Furthermore, while thermal surveillance is
technically non-intrusive, it is clearly capable of revealing informa-
tion about the internal activities of the home. This type of
government action infringes upon the exact personal and societal
values protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Michael D. O'Mara

